Which legal changes could steer the low-carbon transition ? This article argues that one key factor is the management of the interplay among different legal regimes. Conflicts among EU climate law, State aid law and international investment law are a case in point. These three legal regimes affect investments in renewable energy sources, but they cannot be coordinated unless each of them shares the goals pursued by the other ones. This approach, grounded on the idea of polycentric governance, could spur investments and avoid the frictions stemming from attempts at imposing a hierarchical order. The article advances several proposals, clustered around the redundancy principle and the safety net principle, to exploit the benefits of polycentricity in the current legal frameworks.
Introduction: managing the interplay among legal regimes
Which legal changes could steer the low-carbon transition ? This article argues that one key factor is the management of the interplay among different legal regimes. Conflicts among EU climate law, State aid law and international investment law are a case in point. These three legal regimes affect investments in renewable energy sources, but they cannot be coordinated unless each of them shares the goals pursued by the other ones. This approach, grounded on the idea of polycentric governance, could spur investments and avoid the frictions stemming from attempts at imposing a hierarchical order.
The benefits of a successful coordination of legal regimes become clear when considering the breadth of the changes entailed by the low-carbon transition. Switching to a new fuel or a new
The legal regimes on generation of energy from RES are a case in point. In the last few years, the national and international litigation on RES support schemes in the EU has made investors and policymakers acutely aware that coordination is missing. EU climate law, EU State aid law and international investment law are at cross-purpose because each of them pursues different goals and employs different legal tools. Most importantly, the application of each legal regime entails a different distribution of benefits and losses among investors, energy users, producers, suppliers and network operators. This means that just invoking more coordination will not allow to make any progress. What I shall argue instead is that each legal regime has to modify its goals and legal tools in order to balance the conflicting interests at stake. This approach is required both because the interplay among legal regimes reveals the polycentric nature of energy governance and because the policy choices made within each regime will invariably affect the other ones. To put it differently, the main issue is how to foster RES investments in an institutional environment which lacks a hierarchical structure to manage interdependencies among decision-making levels, goals and tools. So far each regime seems to assume that a hierarchical solution can be found. This wrong premise prompts the adoption of measures and interpretative practices that enhance frictions among legal regimes and do not help reduce investors' risks.
Section 2 describes the investment problem in EU RES policy. The next two sections explain why the RES investment problem cannot be solved without addressing interdependencies with other legal regimes. More specifically, section 3 explains how EU State aid law shapes RES policy. Section 4 discusses the (real or supposed) frictions between the two EU regimes on one hand and international investment law on the other hand. Section 5 suggests that a polycentric approach could inspire a range of measures and interpretative practices aimed at reducing frictions and exploiting the strengths of each decision-making level. Section 6 summarizes the analysis.
The RES investment problem
Under many respects, EU RES policy can be considered a success story: it created a new market for renewable sources, strengthened EU companies' position in the global competition for innovation 8 and clarified the area of shared competence between the EU and national levels. In was the OECD area that had experienced the largest increase (from 5.8%) in its RES share since 1990. 9 Though, the development of EU RES policy has been much less straightforward than this data suggests. The performance of the earlier EU interventions was below expectations. the EU as a whole is on track to the 2020 target, even though the sub-target of 10% for the transport sector will probably be missed (only 6.7% in 2015).
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Nobody denies that the EU legal framework catalysed national efforts and fostered investments in the RES sector. However, several studies document the strong differences that had to be overcome during the negotiation of climate measures. The negotiation of the RES Directives made no exception. Several conflicting problem frames were proposed. Support for RES could be justified according to the internal market frame, the energy security frame or the sustainability frame. 12 Each perspective was connected to a different understanding of the measures that were or were not acceptable, as well as the legitimacy of action at EU level. The indicative or binding nature of the targets, the criteria to share burdens among Member States, as well as the degree of harmonization of support schemes were the most contentious issues.
Moreover, the measures adopted in the RES sector reflected compromises achieved in the negotiation of other parts of EU climate law, most importantly the emission trading system. leverage it needed in the negotiation with the co-legislators and the Member States. Moreover, additional flexibility and side payments had to be granted to the Member States facing higher costs of adaptation to the energy transition.
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That political compromises have to be accepted is not surprising. The most worrisome aspect is that the EU decision-making process might have reduced the effectiveness of the RES legal framework. At the end of 2016, the Commission submitted a proposal for a third RES Directive.
Following the conclusions of the European Council in October 2014, the EU target to 2030 for RES was set up at 27% of gross final consumption. This target means that by 2030 half of EU electricity should be generated from RES. Though, the explanatory memorandum attached to the proposal noted that RES investments in the EU have fallen some 60% since 2011. At the same time, the memorandum explained that to achieve the 2030 target €1 trillion investments will be required. 14 This means that the EU will have to compete with other markets, mainly the Asian ones, to attract a large share of the investments it needs in the coming years. 15 This observation already suggests that the internal dimension of the EU RES policy will be inextricably linked to the dynamics of global RES markets, the RES strategies employed in other regions and the ensuing investment flows. But the range of interdependencies becomes clearer when we focus on the causes of the investment shortfall in the current legal framework.
Two of such causes are worth discussing in detail.
To begin with, the 2009 RES Directive did little to promote the integration of support schemes across the Member States. The heated debate about the adoption of an EU-wide certificate trading system, both within the Commission and with the Member States, is well documented.
Attempts at furthering the harmonization of support schemes were defeated. For several years, the Commission engaged in a futile battle against feed-in tariffs, undoubtedly the most effective support scheme for early-stage RES technologies. However, the Commission was right in fearing that purely national support schemes would increase the costs of the energy transition. At the same time, the regulatory choices on market design lead to a specific distribution of costs and benefits, not only within the EU but also in the context of trade relationships with third countries. Unlike trade of fossil fuels, trade of RES electricity is directly dependent on the legal regimes governing access to infrastructures. Therefore, trade relationships with third countries will depend to a large extent on the acceptance or rejection of the EU regulatory model for the RES sector.
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The two causes of the investment shortfall share a common trait, that is the lack of incentives to coordinate RES policies across the EU, national and sub-national levels. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Winter Package proposed by the Commission at the end of 2016 tries to foster integration across levels. Even though national support schemes will be opened to a limited extent and regional cooperation will still be voluntary, the new governance framework proposed in the context of the Energy Union strategy (described in section 4) should provide incentives for regional planning in the RES sector. The lack of national binding RES targets to 2030 should not be deemed a negative signal, but a shift to a broader governance approach. 23 Furthermore, the new rules on wholesale markets should allow to manage RES variability while ensuring security of supply. Their effectiveness will largely depend on how flexibility from several different energy sources and services will be rewarded. The new rules should also give RES producers access to all market segments. Specific provisions on the design of support schemes and on capacity mechanisms aim at reducing investors' uncertainty. Both aspects are linked to the other two legal regimes addressed in this article and will be discussed in the next two sections.
The RES investment problem has been a consequence of the constraints that the EU decisionmaking process imposed on the governance of the sector. While national interests pushed against a higher degree of market integration across the EU, the increasing RES share in the 22 energy mix has made purely national approaches untenable. This means that the main task for the next decade is to build new coordination mechanisms within the RES legal framework.
However, focusing exclusively on the reform of that framework risks to be fruitless. No less important are the coordination mechanisms with other legal regimes affecting RES investments.
The next two sections explain why this class of interdependencies cannot be overlooked.
RES investments and State aid law
State aid law is often considered a peculiar feature of the EU legal system. The only other legal regime directly concerned with subsidies is WTO law. However, energy subsidies for fossil fuels and RES are widespread in both developed and developing countries. After the 2009 G20 committed to phase out and rationalize over the medium term inefficient fossil fuels subsidies, the international debate on their definition and on possible avenues for reform brought to light their size and clarified their direct and indirect effects. Consider first the overall purpose of the EEAG. They tried to achieve a balance between the need to reduce the costs of RES support and the costs to be borne by energy-intensive industries during the energy transition. One drawback of this approach is that competition will be distorted in favour of more resourceful Member States willing to grant exemptions to their energyintensive industries. 34 Another unintended effect of the EEAG might have been to provide Member States an escape route from costly support schemes. On one hand, the Commission invited Member States to avoid retrospective cuts, on the other hand gave them a justification for such cuts. 35 The obligations stemming from the EEAG could be exploited opportunistically to prevent legal challenges from the investors. Furthermore, the attempt to restrict Member
States' choices to market-based support schemes is driven by the same purpose of limiting the overall amount of aid. But whether this strategy was a sound one on economic grounds is heavily debated.
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A broader objection to the current State aid regime for the energy sector is that the Commission is not making any distinction between aid directed at RES and aid directed at fossil fuels.
Indeed, in the past State aid law has been used to authorize compensation granted to fossil fuel producers for stranded costs resulting from the liberalization process, as well as in the framework of regional aid and rescue and restructuring aid. Guidelines were issued in 2012 to compensate with free allowances industries at risk of 'carbon leakage' within the EU emission trading system. The aid regime for public services can also be used to authorize support to fossil fuels. A special regime, still in force until the end of 2027, also applied to aid for the coal industry. It could be argued that support to fossil fuels producers is the price to be paid to smooth out the low-carbon transition. But it cannot be denied that resources devoted to fossil fuels are not made available to low-carbon technologies. This is acknowledged by the Commission as well. In its analysis of energy costs and prices, published together with the Winter Package, it reported that fossil fuels subsidies stood at around €41.9 billion in 2012. If environmental externalities are taken into account, the total amount jumps to €300 billion. The same analysis reports that RES subsidies amounted to €41 billion. 38 
Is there a conflict between EU law and international investment law ?
In the last few years, the two hottest areas of confrontation between EU law and international investment law have been the frontal attack the Commission launched against intra-EU bilateral investment agreements (BITs) and the proposal to replace decentralized investment arbitration with a multilateral investment court. In this article I leave aside both issues, the first one because it could be soon clarified by the Court, 42 the second one because the proposal is still at an early stage. 43 I will instead address a more general issue, namely to what extent is it possible to coordinate EU law and international investment law to ensure an adequate level of investment protection in the energy sector.
Fears that EU law could not ensure such a level were fuelled by international litigation on retrospective cuts to RES support schemes. Starting from 2014, the Energy Charter Treaty became the most frequently invoked legal basis in arbitral proceedings against EU Member
States. A significant outbreak of litigation on retrospective cuts also took place before national courts. 44 How arbitral tribunals and national courts dealt with two legal issues allows to measure the distance between the EU and international regimes, as well as to identify the barriers to be overcome to achieve a better coordination. The first legal issue is the relationship between investors' protection and states' right to regulate. The second legal issue has to do with the priority that State aid law grants to the avoidance of market distortions, thus downplaying investors' protection.
To begin with, the extent of Member States' right to revise their support schemes is at stake.
The disputes often turn on the interpretation of the fair and equitable treatment (FET) clauses in BITs (or the equivalent provisions in the Energy Charter Treaty), as well as on the assessment of investors' legitimate expectations. Differences between arbitral tribunals and EU courts in the interpretation of these concepts should not be overemphasized. The threshold for a finding 42 The BGH asked the Court of Justice (Case C-284/16) whether investment arbitration clauses in intra-EU BITs are compatible with EU law. On 19 September 2017 Advocate General Wathelet concluded that they are because no discrimination on grounds of nationality can be identified and BITs provide wider protection to investors. The judgement of the Court will affect the pending infringement proceedings against Austria, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia and Sweden, who declined to terminate their intra-EU BITs (see Grisel suggests that over the years a consistent interpretation of the FET clause has emerged.
According to the authors, arbitrators are usually willing to engage in an assessment of the factors which justify states' right to regulate and to balance it with investors' entitlements.
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Perhaps this disagreement simply reflects the decentralized character of investment arbitration.
But it could also suggest that arbitration alone cannot be relied upon to enhance coordination 45 subsidies. Should this be the case, the investor winning the arbitration could still be entitled to damages for an amount equivalent to a significant share of the aid.
Secondly, should any compensation be forbidden because the support scheme is deemed totally unlawful, the investor could still avail itself of compensatory remedies at national level. 59-60) that the Italian government slowed the notification process and did not provide the information needed to assess the compatibility of the aid. 58 In his Opinion, AG Colomer observed (points 194-198 ) that the Member State can be held liable for infringing the obligation to provide prior notification to the Commission, but noted that, if an entitlement to compensation is recognised, the damage cannot be regarded as being equal to the sum of the amounts to be repaid, since this would constitute an indirect grant of the aid found to be illegal and incompatible with the common market. It must be acknowledged that actions for damages brought by beneficiaries have been rare so far. They usually face several hurdles of both a procedural and substantive type. 60 A judgement by the Italian Supreme Court, which rejected damage claims brought by beneficiaries of unlawful aid, provides an illustration of those hurdles. 61 The judges argued that State aid law does not confer individual rights to beneficiaries, but only to their competitors. This means that one of the requirements for Francovich liability, that is EU rules conferring individual rights,
is not fulfilled. But we have seen above that the Atzeni case suggests the opposite to be true.
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With regard to liability grounded on Italian rules, the Court rejects the damage claim because beneficiaries of unlawful aid are not entitled to legitimate expectations. But we have observed above that beneficiaries should be entitled to claim damages because the unlawfulness of the aid was dependent on Member States' behaviour, thus irrespective of any assessment of legitimate expectations.
The limited availability of compensatory remedies before national courts could suggest that the arbitration system still grants stronger protection to investors. But it should be noted that the latter usually receive a small share of the damages they claim. 63 The interesting question is which adjudicatory system (arbitral, national, EU) is able to work out liability rules which provide incentives for a more transparent and predictable management of support schemes.
Compensatory remedies should be focused on encouraging the adoption of good governance practices. It has been observed that in international investment arbitration win rates for investors are correlated to the quality of governance, more specifically to the protection of property rights and the impartiality of national bureaucracies. 64 These two indicators represent rough proxies for the quality of governance and do not suggest how to improve it. The argument made here is that the relationship between adjudicatory systems and governance could be strengthened if 65 In international investment arbitration, the ambiguity surrounding the notion of legitimate expectations could be partially dispelled by anchoring liability to the violation of procedures set down in the field of energy and climate planning. From this perspective, the interplay between State aid law and international investment law could be harnessed to prevent conflicts, not to establish hierarchies of values.
Both the debate surrounding the meaning of the right to regulate and the barriers that State aid law raises to investors' compensation confirm the lack of coordination between EU law and international investment law. The proposals discussed in this section could reduce conflicts, but they should be connected to a broader shift of the legal framework toward polycentric
governance. The next section shows how this goal should be accomplished.
Polycentric solutions for RES investments
The previous three sections show that the three legal regimes promote different types of investments with different tools. EU climate law promotes low-carbon investments through support schemes and market design, EU State aid law promotes any kind of investments which can be funded with market mechanisms, and international investment law promotes any kind of foreign investments with bilateral or multi-lateral treaties. Clearly, each regime addresses the investment needs of different categories of market players. Thus, there is no reason to assume that the same types of investments will be encouraged. Conflicts arise not because the three regimes are unwilling to provide investors with an adequate level of protection, but because each regime adopts its own balancing criteria.
Conflicts among legal regimes are a recurring theme in several areas. These questions suggest that prioritizing goals in a hierarchical fashion is not enough. Nonhierarchical coordination could be a promising alternative. To be sure, a mix of hierarchical and non-hierarchical governance is often observable in many fields, with the relationships between them ranging from conflictual to synergic. The question here is whether it is possible to design some degree of non-hierarchical cooperation in order to address the conflicts among the three regimes discussed in this article.
The concept of polycentricity provides the broadest approach to non-hierarchical governance.
It has been widely discussed in the climate change literature. 68 According to the framework proposed by the late Vincent and Elinor Ostrom, the founders of the Bloomington School of political economy or institutional analysis, the main strength of polycentric approaches is that action can take place at different scales, even though coordination among decision-making levels is needed. Elinor Ostrom was ready to acknowledge that several problems could hamper polycentric solutions, namely leakage, inconsistent policies, inadequate certification, gaming behaviour and free riding. 69 These problems point to the need to understand the conditions under which polycentricity can foster a greater degree of coordination than other governance modes. 70 The argument here is that a shift from hierarchical to polycentric approaches could help address the coordination problems faced by the three legal regimes affecting RES investments. Such a shift could be accomplished through interpretative techniques, but more ambitiously it could be embedded in EU energy governance. An explicit assumption made here is that polycentricity needs to be supported by a 'legal scaffolding', that is a set of legal rules which steer non-hierarchical coordination while at the same time providing a safety net against coordination failures.
Two general principles help identify the legal changes which could foster coordination. freedom available to the Member States should be balanced with stronger obligations on joint support schemes and regional cooperation. The main advantage of this approach is that, by exploiting the comparative advantages of each national industry, it could reduce the overall amount devoted to RES subsidies. Therefore, the market distortions State aid law tries to avoid should decrease as well. 73 Thirdly, State aid law should be harnessed to phase out subsidies to fossil fuels, thus reducing market distortions and freeing resources for RES investments. The reform of fossil fuels subsidies is a long-term process which entails both compensatory measures and complementary interventions to ensure its effectiveness. 74 State aid procedures are well positioned to guide the process and set up the right level of support to be allocated to each sector and category of stakeholders affected by the phasing out. At the same time, the Commission should manage the interplay with several other international regimes involved in the reform of fossil fuels subsidies. 75 These three proposals are expression of a polycentric view because they acknowledge that climate law and State aid law overlap and influence each other. But whereas a hierarchical coordination means that the goals of State aid law have to prevail over the goals of climate law, a polycentric approach allows to modify the goals pursued by each regime in order to reduce coordination costs. Moreover, it was pointed out in section 4 that State aid law is more effective in ensuring compliance as compared to infringement proceedings. If environmental sustainability is considered an important goal, the most effective enforcement tools available in EU law should be deployed.
Coordinating climate law and international investment law
The new energy and climate plans could foster polycentric governance in two ways. Firstly, they could provide a shared understanding of the goals to be pursued, both at national and at regional level. Indeed, the low-carbon transition requires a long-term vision in which the state does not only reduce the risks for private investors, but directly contributes to reduce the uncertainty of the innovation process. 76 The plans are one of the best available tools to ensure that public interventions adopt such vision. Secondly, they could become the reference point to establish the level of protection to be granted to investors. By performing these two functions, These provisions could support and interpretation of free trade agreements which requires all EU policies to comply with, and take into account their impact on, international obligations.
With specific reference to climate policies, further support for this interpretation comes from the EU's duty to promote international cooperation in order to ensure sustainable development (Article 21(2)(f) TEU). 78 The regulatory cooperation bodies envisaged by CETA and other free trade agreements could help collect evidence about such impact and may be identify solutions which could reduce frictions with commercial partners.
Should the Commission become more sensitive to international investment obligations, the second polycentric revision should come from arbitrators. They should be more willing to undertake a detailed assessment of the compatibility between EU law and investors' protection. 79 In some cases, they should come to the conclusion that compliance with EU law does not entail an infringement of investors' rights, notwithstanding the losses the latter could avoid were EU law not to apply. This suggestion is in line with the proposal made above about the link between the contents of the energy and climate plans and the principle of legitimate expectations. If both EU institutions and arbitral tribunals pay attention to each other's concerns, the interplay among multiple decision-making centres could be managed effectively.
A link with the proportionality debate in international investment law can also be identified. It has been proposed to address the interplay between the right to regulate and investors' protection through a proportionality assessment, in some cases coupled with some degree of deference to states' regulatory autonomy. 80 Taking into account the polycentric nature of governance means to include in the proportionality assessment, and more specifically in the evaluation of the relationship between the ends pursued and the means chosen, the entire range of regulatory choices made with regard to RES investments.
The third revision was already discussed in section 4. Clarifying the scope of Member States' liability toward beneficiaries of unlawful aid would help reduce the distance between the two regimes. To the extent that a Francovich type liability can be identified, the ECJ is in charge of the clarification task. The Commission could contribute on its own initiative by asking for studies on this subject or taking a position on liability toward beneficiaries in a new version of the Enforcement notice. Both measures could prompt Member States to reflect on possible amendments to their national legal framework.
Conclusions
Amidst the legal changes required by the low-carbon transition, the coordination of goals and tools across legal regimes is one of the most demanding. Interdependencies cannot be ignored.
At the same time, they cannot be easily managed with hierarchical approaches. RES investments will be affected to a similar extent by the three regimes discussed in this article.
However, each of them could impose higher or lower costs on different types of RES investments. This means that achieving the EU 2030 and 2050 targets will depend on the combined effects of all the legal regimes.
Adopting a polycentric approach does not immediately solve all governance problems. But it provides a framework to assess the coherence and the impact of governance choices. Two general principles, redundancy and safety net, provide useful insights on the legal reforms that are needed to coordinate independent legal regimes. Six of the proposed revisions aim at implementing the redundancy principle, two at implementing the safety net principle. State aid law is the legal regime most in need of reform, probably because it has so far adopted a hierarchical approach. Fewer changes are required to investment arbitration, thus suggesting it 80 Divergent opinions have been expressed on the content of the proportionality assessment and the suitability of deference: compare C. Henckels, Proportionality and Deference in Investor-State Arbitration: Balancing Investment Protection and Regulatory Autonomy, Cambridge University Press, 2015 (arguing for a more limited proportionality assessment and a measure of deference) with Stone Sweet and Grisel, The Evolution, cit., 243 ff.
(arguing that a broader proportionality assessment is required and no deference should be allowed).
can usefully contribute to the low-carbon transition even without the more sweeping reforms currently being debated.
All the proposed revisions focus on the interplay among legal regimes. This perspective is often overlooked in the legal literature. Each of the three regimes discussed here has its own specialized debates. But specialists in each field tend to focus on one legal regime at a time.
The interdependencies highlighted in this article call for broader assessments of goals and tools across legal regimes. With specific reference to RES investments, it is likely that other regimes should be considered, for example WTO law, some parts of EU and international environmental law and land planning. Each of them involves decision-making processes at multiple scales. In all these cases, the polycentric principles of redundancy and safety net might help identify coordination mechanisms to be embedded in legal frameworks.
